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1 Introduction
Many countries subsidise commuting to work. Germany and France, for example, allow
taxpayers to deduct commuting expenses from their income tax liability. It is estimated
that scrapping tax deductibility in Germany would raise about 5.5 billion Euro in revenue
(Bach, 2003). Other countries such as Canada and the US do not allow for a special tax
treatment of commuting expenses. However, even in those countries commuters may not
pay their full costs since transport is subsidised in many other ways. Brueckner (2003) cites
evidence that fares for public transit cover only 25 percent of capital and operating expenses
in the US and 50 percent of operating costs in Europe, while user fees, gasoline taxes and
the like cover about 60 percent of total outlays for highways in the US. Gomez-Iban˜ez (1997)
analyzes five US and European studies which arrive at a similar conclusion. However, total
transportation costs including costs of congestion, air pollution and accidents exceed user
payments by far (two till more than ten times as high).
In this paper, we use a model of a monocentric city with two income classes to study
reasons for the existence of commuting subsidies. Individuals choose their location within
the city, and depending on parameters, either the rich or the poor live in the central city
while the other group lives in the suburbs. We then study the effect of commuting subsidies
(which may be negative, i.e., a tax on commuting) on the groups’ equilibrium utility. At
the heart of the model are the redistributive effects of the subsidy. While city residents
pay for the subsidy through general tax revenue, the subsidy redistributes income between
residents with long and short commutes as well as between renters and land owners. These
redistributive effects form the basis for the political support for or against commuting
subsidies (or taxes).
Our main results are as follows. When land is owned by absentee landlords, all city
residents may benefit from commuting subsidies if these reduce average land rent. With
full citizen landownership, however, it must be the case that one group of residents benefits
at the expense of the other. When landownership is symmetric across income classes, we
find that the rich generally benefit from commuting subsidies at the expense of the poor
if the rich live in the suburbs and the poor in the city. The converse, however, is not
necessarily true: If the rich live in the centre, they may still prefer subsidising commuting
since in this case their transport costs must be sufficiently larger than that of the poor.
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Finally, if landownership is asymmetrically distributed, we find that if the rich own more
land than the poor, they will tend to oppose commuting subsidies.
The literature on commuting subsidies has largely followed two different strands. First,
there is a number of studies which analyse the welfare properties of commuting subsidies,
for instance, Brueckner (2003), Richter (2004), and Wrede (2000; 2001; 2003). Brueckner
(2003) uses a spatial model like ours and finds that subsidising transport is inefficient
(see also Fujita, 1989). Subsidies may be efficient, however, in a second best world. In a
multicentric-metropolitan-area framework Wrede (2003) shows that commuting subsidies
may be second-best efficient if Labor income is taxed and if some production factors are
immobile. The basic argument is that the choice of working place would be distorted
by the Labor income tax if commuting costs were not deductible from the income tax
base.1 Zenou (2000) shows that commuting subsidies can be beneficial by reducing urban
unemployment.
Second, there are positive papers which study the effect of subsidies on urban sprawl,
which is generally found to be positive (Brueckner, 2003; Arnott, 1998). As far as we
know, while the redistributive effects of subsidies for commuting have been mentioned by
commentators and calculated by empirical analysts, there is no formal analysis of their
effect in a spatial model. On the empirical side, Kloas and Kuhfeld (2003) use survey
data from Germany and find that the tax deductibility of commuting expenses benefits
high income individuals who have long commutes. If this is correct, why would the poor
majority not scrap the subsidy? This paper aims to provide possible answers to this
question.
Methodologically, our paper builds on the model of a monocentric city model with two
income classes (see Wheaton, 1976; Hartwick et al., 1976). Moreover, we use a model with
(partial) public land ownership, a case which was analysed by Pines and Sadka (1986). A
model with two income groups and disagreement over public goods levels is presented by
de Bartolome and Ross (2003).
The paper proceeds as follows. We introduce our model of a linear city in the next
1Focusing on the consumption-leisure choice, Wrede (2000) and Richter (2004) analysed tax deductions
for work related expenses within a optimal-taxation framework. Deductions for commuting expenses
are possibly second-best efficient if household production (of time) generates non-taxable pure profits.
Otherwise commuting expenses should probably be taxed.
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section. Section 3 introduces our voting framework. In section 4, we study how the results
change if the city is circular. Section 5 analyses the effect of financing subsidies through
income taxes. The last section offers some conclusions.
2 The model
2.1 The monocentric city
Our model of a monocentric city is the standard model with two income classes (see, e.g.,
Wheaton, 1976; Hartwick et al., 1976). We begin with the case of a linear city with unit
width. All individuals travel to the central business district (CBD) to work. The (CBD)
is located at zero and has zero length. There are two groups of residents indexed i = l, h
who differ by income and transport cost. Income is denoted yi, and we assume group l
is poor and group h rich, yl < yh (more below). There is a total of n residents and ni
individuals in group i where nl > nh, so the poor form the majority in the city. The round
trip commuting cost for an individual who lives r km from the CBD is tir for i = l, h. Since
part of commuting costs consist of the opportunity cost of time, we assume that th ≥ tl,
i.e., the rich have higher commuting costs than the poor.
Commuting costs are subsidized at rate σ. Note that we allow for negative subsidies,
i.e. taxes on commuting expenditures. Examples of commuting taxes would include road
pricing, gasoline taxes etc in excess of the true costs of commuting. For simplicity, we as-
sume that the subsidy covers a certain percentage of all commuting costs. This assumption
could be questioned on the grounds that the rich have higher time costs, but only money
costs of commuting are subsidized. However, in general, the rich choose more expensive
(viz. faster) transport modes. Brueckner (2003) studies transport mode choice by different
income classes in the same framework as ours. He shows that the rich opt for transport
modes with higher money and lower time costs than the poor. Hence, it would be pos-
sible to endogenise the differing time and money costs of commuting and reach similar
conclusions as we do now.
To balance the budget, a lump-sum tax of T is levied on each city resident.2 We assume
2The form of financing the subsidy has obvious distributional consequences. We return to this question
below in Section 5.
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that city residents vote on the level of the subsidy and lump sum tax prior to choosing their
place of residence and consumption of goods and housing. We solve the model backwards
and first analyse consumption and location choices and turn to the determination of the
voting equilibrium in the next section.
Individuals have identical, strictly increasing and quasiconcave utility functions, u(x, z),
defined over consumption x and housing (lot size), z. We assume consumption and housing
to be normal goods. Let the price of housing be q. Let individual labour income be wi and
assume that an individual of type i receives a fraction θi of average differential land rent
(ADR). Letting αi ≡ ni/(nl +nh) be group i’s population share, we require αlθl +αhθh = θ,
where θi ≥ 0, i = l, h, and θ ∈ [0, 1], and 1 − θ is the degree of absentee land ownership.
Total income for an individual in group i is then yi = wi + θiADR. We assume wl < wh
and yl < yh, i.e., group l has lower labour income than group h and in addition it may
or may not have lower rental income. Individuals are assumed to be perfectly mobile. In
equilibrium, therefore, an i-type individual must attain the same utility level regardless of
his or her place of residence.
We model the city as closed, i.e., the utility level ui attained by an i-type citizen
in equilibrium is endogenous, whereas the number of i-type residents, ni, is exogenous.
Conversely, in an open city, ui is exogenous while ni is endogenous, where changes in
fiscal parameters lead to migration responses of citizens from or to other cities.3 The
open city model would be more appropriate if the goal of the analysis is the introduction
of commuting subsidies by a single city. However, if we want to study the effect of a
coordinated use of subsidies in a system of cities, the closed city model is more appropriate.
2.2 The urban equilibrium
The consumer chooses x and z to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint, x+qz =
yi − T − (1− σ)tir, or using the budget constraint in the utility function:
max
z
u(yi − T − (1− σ)tir − qz, z). (1)
3See Brueckner (1987) and Fujita (1989) for the distinction between the open and closed city models
and the differing comparative statics.
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The first order condition for an interior solution is:
−qux + uz = 0, (2)
where ux ≡ ∂u/∂x etc. Mobility implies that in equilibrium a household with income yi
must achieve a constant utility level, ui, regardless of his or her residence:
u(yi − T − (1− σ)tir − qz, z) = ui. (3)
The lot size (the ‘bid max’ lot size) which solves (2) and (3) is denoted zi = z(yi −
T, (1− σ)ti, r, ui). Condition (3) together with the optimality condition (2) also defines an
individual’s bid rent function R(yi−T, (1−σ)ti, r, ui), i.e., the maximum rent an individual
living at r would pay to achieve utility level ui. In order to ensure that individuals attain
the same equilibrium utility regardless of location, the bid rent must vary with distance to
compensate for varying transport costs. Differentiating (3), using the envelope theorem,
gives:
Riy =
1
zi
> 0, Rir = −
(1− σ)ti
zi
< 0, Riu = −
1
ziux
< 0, (4)
where Riy ≡ ∂R(yi − T, (1− σ)ti, r, ui)/∂yi and so on.
Landlords are assumed to rent land at the agricultural land rent RA and subsequently
rent out to the highest bidder in the city. The land rent function is:
Φ(r, ·) = max{R(yl − T, (1− σ)tl, r, ul), R(yh − T, (1− σ)th, r, uh), RA}.
Based on (4), we focus on two possible location patterns:
Assumption 1 (PIC) For all r, tl
zl
> th
zh
, where zi ≡ z(yi − T, (1 − σ)ti, r, ui). That is,
the bid rent function of the poor is steeper than that of the rich.
Assumption 2 (RIC) For all r, tl
zl
< th
zh
. That is, the bid rent function of the poor is
flatter than that of the rich.
Under Assumption 1, the bid rent function becomes flatter with rising income, since the
income elasticity of housing demand is assumed to exceed the income elasticity of transport
cost.4 This implies that the poor outbid the rich in the centre and the rich outbid the poor
4Since transport costs differ, the income elasticity of housing demand should be interpreted as the
elasticity with respect to income net of transport cost.
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in the suburbs. Hence, the mnemonic PIC (poor in city). Conversely, under Assumption
2, the rich have steeper bid rent functions than the poor; hence, in this case the rich live
in the centre and the poor in the suburbs (for this case we use the mnemonic RIC, rich in
city).
In the following, we use the subscripts c to denote city residents and s for suburban resi-
dents, respectively. That is, Assumption 1 implies c = l, s = h, and conversely, Assumption
2 implies c = h, s = l.
Average differential land rent is then defined as:
ADR =
1
n
(∫ r1
0
R(yc − T, (1− σ)tc, r, uc)dr +
∫ r2
r1
R(ys − T, (1− σ)ts, r, us)dr − r2RA
)
,
(5)
where r2 is the city border and r1 the border between the two groups, both of which are
endogenous.
The equilibrium in our model can now be completely defined by the following conditions:
R(yl − T, (1− σ)tl, r1, ul) = R(yh − T, (1− σ)th, r1, uh) (6)
R(ys − T, (1− σ)ts, r2, us) = RA (7)∫ r1
0
1
z(yc − T, (1− σ)tc, r, uc)
dr = nc (8)∫ r2
r1
1
z(ys − T, (1− σ)ts, r, us)
dr = ns (9)
T = σt˜, (10)
where t˜ ≡
1
n
[
tc
∫ r1
0
r
z(yc − T, (1− σ)tc, r, uc)
dr + ts
∫ r2
r1
r
z(ys − T, (1− σ)ts, r, us)
dr
]
is average transport costs. Equation (6) is the condition that the bid rent of the poor equals
that of the rich at the boundary between the two classes, r1. Likewise, (7) defines the city
border, where the bid rent of the suburbians (either rich or poor) equals the agricultural
land rent. Equations (8) and (9) are the market clearing conditions for the housing market,
and equation (10) is the government budget constraint.
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Using (7) and (4) in (8) and (9) and integrating gives:
(1− σ)tcnc = −
∫ r1
0
Rr(yc − T, (1− σ)tc, r, uc)dr
= R(yc − T, (1− σ)tc, 0, uc)−R(yc − T, (1− σ)tc, r1, uc) (11)
(1− σ)tsns = −
∫ r2
r1
Rr(ys − T, (1− σ)ts, r, us)dr
= R(ys − T, (1− σ)ts, r1, us)− RA. (12)
Further, integrating (10) by parts, using (7), (6) and (4):
(1−σ)t˜ =
1
n
(∫ r1
0
R(yc − T, (1− σ)tc, r, uc)dr +
∫ r2
r1
R(ys − T, (1− σ)ts, r, us)dr − r2RA
)
,
(13)
that is, in a linear city with linear transport costs, average transport cost net of subsidies
equals average differential land rent (Arnott and Stiglitz, 1981). With (13) and (10), the
utility function can be rewritten as
u(wi + (θi − (1 + θi)σ)t˜− (1− σ)tir − qz, z). (14)
Differentiating (14) gives the effect of the subsidy and average transport costs on individual
bid rent:
Riσ =
tir − (1 + θi)t˜
zi
, Ri
t˜
=
θi − (1 + θi)σ
zi
, i = l, h. (15)
The subsidy lowers net commuting costs by tir, but also increases the lump sum tax by
t˜ and reduces average differential land rent by t˜. The net effect is therefore positive if
tir − (1 + θi)t˜ > 0. For instance, if θi = 0 and tl = th, the subsidy has a positive income
effect (and hence, increases the bid rent) for all individuals who live farther from the CBD
than average. The subsidy will also affect bid rent through its effect on average transport
costs t˜. If t˜ increases by a unit, this increases the lump sum subsidy by σ and changes
average differential land rent by (1− σ), which is positive as long as 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1.
3 Voting
We now turn to the description of the voting game. Each individual votes for her pre-
ferred subsidy and lump-sum tax. Brueckner (2003) shows that an efficient allocation is
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characterized by zero commuting subsidies: taking account of landowner welfare, the equi-
librium without subsidies is efficient. Hence, in the case where all land is owned by city
residents, the subsidy redistributes between the income classes. However, when the degree
of absentee landownership is high, it is possible that both groups benefit from commuting
subsidies since part of the cost may be borne by absentee landowners.
Equations (6), (7), (11), (12) and (13) implicitly define the endogenous variables
r1, r2, u¯l, u¯h and t˜ as a function of the parameters, σ, tl, th, wl, wh, nl, nh, θl, θh and θ. We
will use the notation Rij ≡ R(yj − T, (1− σ)tj, ri, uj) and so on (where r0 = 0).
The voter’s problem is to choose the subsidy rate which maximises her utility subject
to the government budget constraint.
Before explicitly deriving expressions for the reaction of equilibrium utility levels to the
subsidy, we will try to give a preview of the pertinent effects. Consider the indirect utility
function:
v(Φ, Mi) ≡ v(Φ, wi + θiADR− (1− σ)tir − σt˜). (16)
Using Roy’s identity, we have
dv(Φ, Mi)
dσ
= vM(−zdΦ/dσ + tir − (1 + θi)t˜ + (θi − (1 + θi)σ)t˜σ). (17)
We can discern the following effects on utility. First, the subsidy will influence the price of
housing through income effects and the relocation of residents: A resident may benefit if
the subsidy causes the price of housing to fall. Second, there is an income effect which is
positive if tir > (1 + θi)t˜. If θi = 0 and tl = th, this will be the case if the individual lives
farther from the CBD than average. Otherwise, this income effect is positively influenced by
ti and negatively by θi (for given t˜). Note the asymmetry of this income effect: Assumption
1 implies that the income effect will be positive (on average) for the rich since they have
larger marginal transport costs and live farther from the CBD than the poor. Assumption 2,
however, implies the poor live farther from the CBD than the rich but, since their marginal
transport cost is lower, it is not clear that the income effect is positive for them. Third,
income is also affected via the reaction of average distance: if average distance increases,
the lump sum subsidy increases. Moreover, if the subsidy reduces average differential land
rent, net income falls as long as θi > 0 and this effect will be more severe the larger θi.
Since ∂(ADR)/∂σ = −t˜ + (1− σ)∂t˜/∂σ, we would expect average differential rent to fall
if average distance increases only moderately.
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Figure 1: Effect of commuting subsidies in case PIC (a) and RIC (b).
In order to view the difference in the changes between cases PIC and RIC, consider
figure 1, which depicts the ‘first round effects’ of a commuting subsidy. Panel (a) depicts
case PIC and panel (b) case RIC. For the sake of argument, assume θi = 0, i = l, h, and
that r1 equals the average distance, r˜, in both cases. Define rˆj = t˜/tj for j = c, s to be
the distance where transport costs for a type i resident just equal average transport costs.
PIC implies rˆs < r˜ < rˆc; conversely, RIC implies rˆc < r˜ < rˆs. This is shown in the figures,
where bid rent functions rotate around points A and B. It is also obvious that the effect
of this would be to decrease r1 in case PIC and increase r1 in case RIC. An increase in
r1 increases utility of city residents. This discussion shows that in case PIC group l – the
central city residents – is likely to oppose the subsidy while this is not necessarily true in
case RIC, where the income effect for group h who lives centrally may be positive and the
boundary between the two groups may shift out.
Of course, these first round effects lead to further adjustments which then determine the
reaction of equilibrium utilities, along with the effect on r1 and r2. Consider for instance
case PIC. If r1 were to decrease and r2 to increase as suggested by the figure, the rich
would have more space than necessary to house them.5 To restore equilibrium, rich utility
5This follows since zy < 0: for given utility, increasing income leads to higher bid rent and hence to
lower housing consumption. But this implies that for given u¯h population density would decrease for all
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would have to increase so that the bid rent of the rich shifts down and housing consumption
increases. Similar arguments apply to the poor: If r1 were to decrease, population density
would fall in the central city, and to restore equilibrium, poor utility would have to fall
which would then decrease housing consumption and increase density. However, it may
be that in equilibrium r1 increases and poor utility increases too, since the poor benefit
from the fact that the rich move further out. In fact, this is what we find in some of our
examples below.
The model does produce some preliminary results which are of interest.
Lemma 1 Increasing σ decreases equilibrium land rent at the CBD (0) and at the border
between rich and poor, r1.
Proof. Differentiating (12) shows dΦ(r1)/dσ = −tsns. Using this in (6) and substituting
in (11) gives dΦ(0)/dσ = −tsns − tcnc. 
The degree of landownership is a crucial determinant of preferences for commuting
subsidies in our model. We first analyse commuting subsidies when only citizens are
landlords, i.e. when θ = 1. We then consider the other extreme of complete absentee
landownership, i.e. θ = 0.
For citizen-landownership we get the following fundamental result.
Proposition 1 If θ = 1, starting from σ = 0, sign ∂ul/∂σ = − sign ∂uh/∂σ.
Proof. Totally differentiating the equilibrium equation system (6), (7), (11), (12) and
r1 < r < r2, while the rich ‘territory’ has increased).
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(13), using (4) and (15), evaluating at σ = 0 and simplifying gives:
∂uc
∂σ
= −u0cx u
1c
x u
1s
x
∫ r2
r1
Rudr
{
n2sθcts(z
1stc − z
1cts) + t˜(nl + nh)(1− θc)tc
−z0c((ns + nc(1− 2θc))tc(nctc + nsts) + θc(n
2
ct
2
c − n
2
st
2
s))
}/
{
u1sx (nl + nh)
∫ r2
r1
Rudr
(
u1cx (tc − θc(nctc + nsts)) + θcnstsu
0c
x
)
+θcnstcu
0c
x u
1c
x
∫ r1
0
Rudr
}
(18)
∂us
∂σ
= −
∂uc
∂σ
∫ r1
0
Rudr∫ r2
r1
Rudr
, (19)
where we have used (from (15) and integration by parts, using (11) and (12))
∫ r1
0
Rt˜ =
nc(θc − (1 + θc)σ),
∫ r2
r1
Rt˜ = ns(θs − (1 + θs)σ), and
∫ r1
0
Rσ +
∫ r2
r1
Rσ = −t˜(θcnc + θsns).
Hence, using (4) we have sign(∂us/∂σ) = − sign(∂uc/∂σ). 
If there are no absentee landlords, there is an exact distributional antagonism between
rich and poor (except in the knife-edge case where both groups vote for a subsidy rate
of zero). Hence, if one group loses the other one benefits from a small subsidy. This
makes intuitive sense, since we know that in this case subsidies are inefficient (Fujita,
1989; Brueckner, 2003). However, we cannot say in general which group will benefit from
the subsidy. To end up with less ambiguity, we consider uniform landownership in the next
proposition.
Proposition 2 If θl = θh = 1, starting from σ = 0, (i) we have ∂ul/∂σ < 0 < ∂uh/∂σ
in case of PIC provided that th − tl is not too large. (ii) In case of RIC, if z
0h ≥ z1l,
∂uh/∂σ > 0 > ∂ul/∂σ.
Proof. Setting σ = 0 and θl = θh = 1 in (18) gives:
∂uc
∂σ
= u0cx u
1c
x u
1s
x
∫ r2
r1
Rudr
{
nsts(z
1cts − z
1stc) + z
0c(tc − ts)(nctc + nsts)
}/
{
u1sx
∫ r2
r1
Rudr(u
1c
x (tc − ts) + tsu
0c
x ) + tcu
0c
x u
1c
x
∫ r1
0
Rudr
}
. (20)
Since Ru < 0, the denominator in (20) is negative under RIC and also under PIC provided
that th − tl is not too large. Since ts/z
1s < tc/z
1c, the numerator is positive under PIC
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since ts ≥ tc which proves (i). Under RIC, the numerator is positive if z
0c ≥ z1s. The
result then follows directly from Proposition 1. 
To understand the result, note from Lemma 1 that equilibrium land rent at the CBD,
Φ(0), falls by tcnc + tsns. This fall can be decomposed into the partial effects of σ, uc and
t˜. Since R0cσ = −2t˜/z
0c < 0 and Ru < 0, the fall in land rent must be due to an increase in
central city residents’ utility if R0c
t˜
t˜σ is larger than 2t˜/z
0c − (tcnc + tsns). Writing out the
corresponding expressions leads to (20).
Given a uniform distribution of land among rich and poor citizens, rich voters benefit
from (small) commuting subsidies while poor voters oppose them in case of PIC. This
holds true even if rich voters live closer to the CBD provided that the income effect on
housing demand is strong. If the rich rent relatively large flats, they occupy a large area
and commute long distances.
However, if the rich have larger rental income than the poor, θh > θl, the effect of
the subsidy on income received from land rents acts to mitigate the preference towards
commuting subsidies more for the rich class. We have no general result for this but we will
illustrate the effect of differential landownership by means of an example below.
The next proposition describes the interior optimum in case of uniform land distribution
and identical commuting costs.
Proposition 3 Let θl = θh = 1 and tl = th = t. Suppose that utility is concave in σ for
both groups so there exist unique interior optimum subsidy rates, σ(yi) ∈ (−∞, +∞) for
i = l, h. Then the preferred subsidy rate of high income voters is strictly higher than the
preferred subsidy of low income voters.
Proof. Totally differentiating the equilibrium equation system (6), (7), (11), (12) and
(13) at θl = θh = 1 and tl = th = t, using (4) and (15), gives:
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∂ul
∂σ
= u0lx u
1l
x
{
nh(2σ − 1)tu
1h
x (z
1l − z1h)
∫ r2
r1
Rudr + (nl + nh)σ(z
0l(nl + nh)t− 2t˜)
}/
{
(nl + nh)σu
1l
x + (2σ − 1)u
0l
x
(
u1lx
∫ r1
0
Rudr + u
1h
x
∫ r2
r1
Rudr
)}
(21)
∂uh
∂σ
= u1hx
{
u1lx nht(z
1h − z1l)
(
u0lx (2σ − 1)
∫ r1
0
Rudr + (nl + nh)σ
)
+(nl + nh)σu
0l
x (z
0l(nl + nh)t− 2t˜)
}/
{
(nl + nh)σu
1l
x + (2σ − 1)u
0l
x
(
u1lx
∫ r1
0
Rudr + u
1h
x
∫ r2
r1
Rudr
)}
(22)
Substituting from (21) in (22), we get
∂uh
∂s
=
u1hx
u1lx
(
∂ul
∂σ
+ tu1lx nh((z
1h − z1l)
)
. (23)
Since z is a normal good, z1h > z1l. Therefore, since the optimum subsidy rate of the poor
fulfils ∂ul/∂σ = 0, we have
∂uh(s(yl, ·))
∂σ
>
∂ul(s(yl, ·))
∂σ
= 0 (24)
and hence, by concavity, s(yh, ·) must be larger than s(yl, ·). 
According to Proposition 3, concavity of utility functions in σ would imply that the rich
prefer higher subsidies than the poor as long as θh = θl. With identical marginal transport
costs and landownership across groups, the rich live in the suburbs and prefer higher
commuting subsidies than the poor. Optimal subsidy rates may, however, be positive or
negative.
Next, we analyse complete absentee land ownership, i.e. θ = 0.
Proposition 4 If θ = 0, starting from σ = 0, (i) under PIC at least one group votes
either for a (small) subsidy or a tax. (ii) If ADR < z0c(Φ(0) − RA), all citizens prefer a
(small) subsidy under PIC.
Proof. Totally differentiating the equilibrium equation system (6), (7), (11), (12) and
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(13) at θ = 0 and σ = 0, using (4) and (15), gives:
∂uc
∂σ
= u0cx
(
z0c(nctc + nsts)− t˜
)
(25)
∂us
∂σ
=
u1sx
u1cx tc
(
ts
∂uc
∂σ
+ u1cx
(
t˜(ts − tc) + nsts(z
1stc − z
1cts)
))
. (26)
(i) Under PIC, since tc ≤ ts and tc/z
1c > ts/z
1s, (26) is strictly positive if (25) is zero (and
(25) is strictly negative if (26) is zero). (ii) Using (11) and (12), (25) is positive if and only
if ADR < z0c(Φ(0)− RA), in which case (26) is also positive under PIC. 
With absentee land ownership, the efficient equilibrium (with σ = 0) is certainly
not supported by all citizens under PIC. Proposition 4 shows the ambiguous effect of
commuting subsidies. From Lemma 1, equilibrium land rent at the CBD must fall by
tcnc + tsns = Φ(0)−RA. However, we know from (15) that the partial effect of the subsidy
is to decrease the bid rent of the resident who resides at the CBD by t˜/z0c. Since Ru < 0,
the utility of inner city residents increases if and only if z0c(Φ(0) − RA) > t˜ = ADR (at
σ = 0). The Proposition also shows that there may be cases where both groups benefit
from a subsidy. The intuition for this is that part of the costs of the subsidy is borne by
absentee landlords in the form of lower land rents.
Example. In order to illustrate our results and provide further insight, we now present
a numerical example. Suppose utility is of the Cobb-Douglas form
u(x, z) = x1−αzα.
Solving for the Marshallian demand for z gives
Z(·) =
αM
q
, where M ≡ w + (θ − (1 + θ)s)t˜− (1− σ)tr. (27)
We also find the bid rent function and ‘bid max lot size’ (Fujita, 1989):
R(·) = α(1− α)
1−α
α u¯−
1
α M
1
α , z(·) = (1− α)
α−1
α u¯
1
α M
α−1
α . (28)
Since Cobb Douglas utility implies an income elasticity of housing demand of 1, PIC (RIC)
will apply if the income elasticity of commuting costs is smaller (greater) than one.
We then solve for the endogenous variables u¯l, u¯h, r1, r2, and t˜ as functions of the ex-
ogenous parameters nl, nh, wl, wh, tl, th, RA, and θ, θl, θh.
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Figure 2: Effect of commuting subsidies (θl = θh = θ = 1).
Our benchmark parameters are α = 0.25, , RA = 0.1, nh = 2, nl = 2.5, wh = 2, wl = 1.4,
and tl = 0.1.
First, let th = 0.12 (which implies PIC). Then, as we already know, for θl = θh = 1, the
rich benefit from subsidies while the poor lose. This case is depicted in Figure 2, where
the dark curves shows the case without subsidy and the grey curves show the case σ = 0.3.
The figure shows that r1 and r2 increase while average differential rent falls. This is, in
fact, true for all the examples presented in this paper.
We then vary θ and θl (θh is then given by max{0,
nh+nl
nh
θ− nl
nh
θl}). At θ = θl = θh = 0,
both groups benefit from subsidies. For θl = θh = θ, the rich always prefer higher subsidies
than the poor, and further, the poor oppose commuting subsidies for θ > 0.67.
In general this is the picture we get: for each θ, the lower θl, the less the rich benefit
from commuting subsidies and the more the poor benefit because part of the cost is borne
by the rich in the form of lower differential land rent. Clearly, this effect becomes stronger
the larger θ, i.e. the lower the percentage of land in absentee ownership.
Figure 3 shows how support for commuting subsidies depends on θ and θl. In region
R in the figure, there is no majority for subsidies (or alternatively, the majority votes for
commuting taxes) since in this region the poor oppose subsidies. In the region marked PR,
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Figure 3: Support for commuting subsidies in case PIC.
there is unanimous support for subsidies by the rich and poor. This occurs for low θ and
θl below a certain threshold which is a function of θ. In region P, the majority consisting
of the poor support subsidies which are opposed by the rich who in the region of high θ
and low θl oppose subsidies. The figure nicely illustrates Proposition 1: At θ = 1 there is
never unanimous support for positive subsidies.
Consider now the case where commuting costs differ such that we obtain case RIC.
In particular, we assume th = 0.15. Figure 4 shows the support for commuting subsidies
in this case. Interestingly enough, the region where there is a majority which supports
positive commuting subsidies is smaller than in the PIC case. Intuitively, one might have
thought that in case RIC, majority support for commuting subsidies is higher than in
case PIC because the majority lives far from the CBD. As the example shows, this is not
necessarily the case.
4 Circular city
As is well known, the effects of income redistribution in a monocentric city hinge critically
on the assumed shape of the city (see Fujita, 1989). Hence, the assumption of a linear city
17
θθl
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
PR
R
P
Figure 4: Support for commuting subsidies in case RIC.
is not innocuous.
Suppose instead the city is circular with the amount of land available for residential use
at distance r from the CBD given by γr, where γ ≤ 2pi. To simplify, we assume tl = th = t
which implies PIC.
While the equilibrium conditions (6) and (7) are analogous here, (8) and (9) are now
replaced by
nl =
∫ r1
0
1
z(yl − T, (1− σ)t, r, ul)
γrdr (29)
=
γ
(1− σ)t
(∫ r1
0
R(yl − T, (1− σ)t, r, ul)dr − r1Φ(r1)
)
(30)
and
nh =
∫ r2
r1
1
z(yh − T, (1− σ)t, r, uh)
γrdr (31)
=
γ
(1− σ)t
(∫ r2
r1
R(yh − T, (1− σ)t, r, uh)dr + r1Φ(r1)− r2RA
)
, (32)
where again (30) and (32) follow from (29) and (31) on integrating by parts.
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Further, in a circular city with linear transport costs, average differential land rent is
half of average transport costs (Arnott and Stiglitz, 1981):
(1− σ)t˜ = 2ADR, (33)
where
ADR =
1
n
( ∫ r1
0
R(yc − T, (1− σ)tc, r, uc)γrdr
+
∫ r2
r1
R(ys − T, (1− σ)ts, r, us)γrdr −
γr2RA
2
)
. (34)
For citizen landownership, we can show the following result.
Proposition 5 Let θ = 1. Then, in a circular city, starting from σ = 0, sign ∂ul/∂σ =
− sign ∂uh/∂σ. Further, if θl = θh = 1, increasing σ benefits the rich and hurts the poor if
and only if
nl
nh
<
Φ(0)− Φ(r1)
Φ(r1)−RA
. (35)
Proof. Differentiating (6), (7), (30), (32), and (33) and simplifying at θ = 1 and σ = 0
gives:
∂us
∂σ
= −
∂uc
∂σ
∫ r1
0
Ruγrdr∫ r2
r1
Ruγrdr
. (36)
If θl = θh = 1, the poor live closer to the CBD and ∂ul/∂σ can be written as
∂ul
∂σ
=
{
2
(
z1h − z1l
) ∫ r2
r1
Ruγrdr(nl(Φ(r1)−RA)− nh(R(0)− Φ(r1))tu
1l
x u
1h
x
}/
{
γr1(Φ(0)− RA)
(
u1lx
∫ r1
0
Ruγrdr + u
1h
x
∫ r2
r1
Ruγrdr
)
+u1lx u
1h
x
(
z1l − z1h
)(
(Φ(0)− Φ(r1))
∫ r1
0
Ruγrdr
∫ r2
r1
Ruγdr
+(Φ(r1)−RA)
∫ r2
r1
Ruγrdr
∫ r1
0
Ruγdr
)}
. (37)
Since Ru < 0, Φ(0) > Φ(r1) > RA and z
1h > z1l, the numerator is negative. The sign of the
numerator in (37) is therefore the same as the sign of nl(Φ(r1)− RA)− nh(R(0)− Φ(r1).

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Figure 5: Support for commuting subsidies in linear vs. circular city.
Example. We proceed with the same example as in the previous section. In addition,
we assume that all land is available for residential use, γ = 2pi. Figure 5 shows the support
for commuting subsidies in the linear city (grey lines) and circular city (black lines) with
otherwise identical parameters. Transport costs are assumed identical for both groups,
th = tl = 0.1.
Note that the threshold value above which the poor oppose subsidies is higher in the
circular city than in the linear city. This illustrates the property of monocentric models
that the poor city residents may benefit from redistribution to the rich suburbians if rich
move further out to the periphery and land there is relatively abundant.6 On the other
hand, the region where the rich oppose commuting subsidies is larger in the circular city
case.
5 Financing by income tax
In this section, we look at how the method of financing the subsidy changes the distri-
butional effect of commuting subsidies. Suppose that commuting subsidies are financed
by income taxes instead of head taxes. Assume further that only wage income is taxed
6Fujita (1989) shows this property in the case of absentee landownership.
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proportionally at rate τ . Then a consumer’s net wage income is (1 − τ)w. Government
budget balance requires
τw¯ = σt˜, (38)
where w¯ = (nlwl + nhwh)/(nl + nh) is the average wage. Note that voting now effectively
occurs over two variables, τ and σ, but through (38) the choice of σ determines the income
tax rate.
Using (38), utility can now be written
u
(
wi(1− σt˜/w¯)− (1− σ)tr + θi(1− σ)t˜− qz, z
)
, (39)
and we have
Riσ =
rt− (wi/w¯ + θi) t˜
zi
, Ri
t˜
=
θi − σ (wi/w¯ + θi)
zi
. (40)
Suppose that θi = 0. Then, (40) shows that the effect of the subsidy on the individual
bid rent is positive if and only if r/r˜ > wi/w¯, where r˜ is average distance: A voter’s net
income rises with the subsidy to the extent that his wage income is smaller than average
or the distance of his residence from the CBD is larger than average. The following result
shows the effect of commuting subsidies for citizen landownership.
Proposition 6 Assume a linear city with income tax financing. Then, (i) if θ = 1,
starting from σ = 0, sign ∂ul
∂σ
= − sign ∂uh
∂σ
. (ii) Further, if θl = θh = 1, increasing σ
benefits the rich and hurts the poor if and only if
nl + nh
nh
<
(z1h − z1l)(nlwl + nhwh)
(wh − wl)t˜
. (41)
Proof. Totally differentiating the equilibrium equation system (6), (7), (11), (12) and
(13) at θ = 1 and σ = 0, using (40), gives:
∂uc
∂σ
= −
{∫ r2
r1
Rutu
0l
x u
1l
x u
2l
x ((nl + nh)
2t˜wl − (1− θl)(nl + nh)
2z1l(nlwl + nhwh)
−θl(n
2
h(z
1l − z1h) + (nlwl + nhwh)t˜)
}/
{ (
θl
∫ r1
0
Runhu
0l
x u
1l
x +
∫ r2
r1
Ru(θlnhu
0l
x + (1− θl)(nl + nh)u
1l
x )u
1h
x )
)
(nlwl + nhwh)
}
, (42)
∂us
∂σ
= −
∂uc
∂σ
∫ r1
0
Rudr∫ r2
r1
Rudr
, (43)
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Figure 6: Support for commuting subsidies with income tax vs. lump sum tax.
which implies (i). Setting θl = θh = 1 in (42) implies (ii) since Ru < 0. 
Example. We continue with our previous example (with identical commuting costs of
0.1) and introduce income taxes. The support for commuting subsidies is shown in figure 6,
where the dark lines show the case of income taxes and the light lines the case of lump sum
taxation. The figure shows that the region of majority support for commuting subsidies
expands, whereas the region of opposition by the rich is also larger under income taxation
than under lump sum taxation.
Tax on land rent income. How do the results change when land rent is included in
the taxable income base? At first sight, one might think that this would increase the
progressivity of income tax financed commuting subsidies if the rich earn more land rent
income than the poor. However, this is not true. In fact, while increasing σ now raises the
tax rate necessary to finance the subsidy by reducing aggregate land rent, it also reduces
the taxable income of each individual taxpayer (if average land rent falls with the subsidy).
For our example, it turns out that the support for or against commuting subsidies remains
unchanged.
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Tax deductibility of commuting expenses. One method of income tax financing is to
deduct commuting expenses from the income tax base. This is the method chosen in several
European countries. What would be the effect of this method in our model? Intuitively,
with linear income taxes, this would not change very much: the subsidy is the same for all
individuals with the same transport costs and is linear in transport costs, whereas the tax
burden rises linearly with income. If, however, the income tax is progressive, then richer
individuals pay more to finance government subsidies, but also receive higher subsidies
from deducting commuting expenses, for two reasons: first, because of higher transport
costs, and second because of their higher marginal tax rate. The problem in this instance
becomes more complex, since not only the rate of deductibility but also the total progressive
tax schedule must be chosen.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analysed the political economy of commuting subsidies in a mono-
centric city with two income classes. The model has the feature that there is no efficiency
reason for commuting subsidies: if one takes the welfare of city residents and absentee
landlords into account, commuting subsidies are Pareto inefficient (Fujita, 1989; Brueckner,
2003). Hence, the existence of commuting subsidies can be explained by the redistribution
between groups with different political clout.
Some interesting conclusions emerge from our model. If land is owned by absentee
landlords, all city residents may benefit from commuting subsidies if these reduce aggregate
land rents. Hence, commuting subsidies may, at one extreme, be supported by all city
residents. In the case of citizen landownership, commuting subsidies create a distributional
antagonism between city residents and suburbians. In case PIC, this implies the intuitively
sensible result that the rich suburbians benefit from commuting subsidies at the expense
of poor city residents. The converse case, however, is not as simple: if the poor live in the
suburbs, it is not immediate that they benefit at the expense of the rich since the latter
have higher marginal transport costs. Therefore the income effect of commuting subsidies
may, on average be positive for the rich even though they have short commutes. As a
result, the rich may benefit from commuting subsidies even if they live in the central city.
Some possible extensions to the model suggest themselves. First, one might think of
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extending the model to more than two income groups. One could then study whether
the median group benefits from commuting subsidies. This, however, would not change
the basic message. However, one might also look at models where there is no perfect
segregation of income classes across space. This could be due to heterogeneous preferences
within income classes (for instance, families versus singles) or difference in public goods
supply (de Bartolome and Ross, 2003). Finally, an interesting and relevant extension would
be a model with different transport modes with differing subsidy rates. For instance, some
countries allow commuters to deduct only the costs of public transport from their income
tax. Since the rich choose faster and more expensive transport modes (Brueckner, 2003),
this might offset possibly regressive effects of commuting subsidies.
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